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ABSTRACT: Much is made of Darwin’s concept of natural selection, but 
Bernard Stiegler has developed a theory of artificial selection that is arguably 
every bit as important for an understanding of human life, and the life of the mind 
and aesthetics, in particular. Building on work by the paleo-anthropologist, André 
Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler argues that humans evolve biologically insofar as they are 
animals, but only become human through technics. Through tools, we are able to 
take hold of our own future by reconstructing environments to which we are 
maladapted and preserving values that we choose to privilege over and above 
adaptive fitness. These tools also transform the field of our experience, de- and 
refunctionalizing our biological organs in a way that enables the body to interpret 
and be interpreted differently. Perhaps the most prominent example of this 
transformation of the body by technics is to be found in the unconscious, which 
comes into existence through the reorganization of the plastic brain by cultural 
systems of tool-use. Our aesthetic preferences are not simply biologically-
hardwired, but stem from our unconscious inheritance of the culturally transmitted 
and artificially selected codes of symbolic order. 
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But if variations useful to any organic being ever do occur, assuredly 
individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of being preserved 
in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, these 
will tend to produce offspring similarly characterized. This principle of 
preservation, I have called . . . Natural Selection. 
Charles Darwin
1
 
  
The passage of life from the struggle for the satisfaction of need, or 
subsistence, to life as existence, revolving around objects of worship, is 
made possible above all by the fact that with the process of externalization, 
“selection pressure” is refocused around the capacities of the genus Homo 
to invent or make use of artificial organs . . . and for that reason we can no 
longer strictly speak of “natural selection”: it is a matter of artificial 
selection in which art, which is to say technics, and arts and crafts in the 
broadest sense, come to the fore.  
Bernard Stiegler
2
  
 
Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance captures the way in which the meaning of 
a sign or trace is constitutively open to being rewritten in the future, when 
subsequent interpretations retroactively transform our understanding of its earlier 
instances. Several critics, perhaps most prominently Slavoj Žižek,3 have suggested 
that the logic of différance is thus also that of the random variation in natural 
selection, where a mutation in genetic replication amounts to a repetition of 
difference that will retroactively be interpreted as “fit” or “maladaptive.” Bernard 
Stiegler has gone further still, differentiating between two regimes of evolutionary 
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différance, pertaining to natural and artificial selection, respectively. When a foot 
mutates into—or is iterated, repeated as—a hand, it is retroactively reinterpreted as 
a proto-organ for grasping that adapted its bearer for survival. And when a tool is 
added to a hand, the hand, too, is reinterpreted, in what Leroi-Gourhan will call a 
“liberation” and Stiegler a “reinvention” through technics. The tool that 
supplements the hand also reinvents it, with the organ for grasping re-emerging as 
an organ for hammering, carving or writing. The transformation of the field of 
experience means that subjectivity is also reinvented. In being taught to use a tool, 
we are also taught to experience, by internalizing a new horizon of possibilities 
that it opens up: “feeling [le sentir] is tekhnē from the outset,”4 as Stiegler puts it. 
This is the différance of artificial selection, where the who and the what, the 
subject and the tool, continually retrace one another; where the tool, in other 
words, produces a subject through the process of creating its objects. In the second 
volume of De la misère symbolique (Symbolic Misery), this is theorized in terms 
of the effect of the tool on the brain: “It is therefore in its relations to prostheses 
that the human brain, like the human hand and every other human organ, is 
perpetually undergoing functional redefinition” (MS2, 229). The claim is 
reformulated in Stiegler’s more recent work: “the hand writes directly into the 
brain,”5 or: our prostheses reorganize the sensory cortex. 
The notion of functional redefinition, of the “refunctionalization and 
defunctionalization” of organs by technics, serves to make sense of Stiegler’s 
assertion that technical evolution, meaning the reorganization of the living by the 
dead, organized, inorganic matter of technics, amounts to a “new organization of 
différance, a différance of différance” (TT1, 178/186).6 Already a product of the 
différance, or variation, of natural selection, liable to further mutations that might 
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see it interpreted differently in the future, the physiological organ is opened onto a 
second kind of différance, in which its function is deferred into the prosthesis. The 
deferral brings with it a corresponding differentiation of experience, with feeling 
and moreover meaning and aesthetic value produced when physical sensation 
enters into a circuit with the technics that supplement the body; when the use of a 
tool “confers its sense on that which is sensed [confère son sens au senti] by 
inscribing aisthesis within semiosis, within a symbolic and logical horizon” (MS2, 
62). It is this technical inscription of aesthetics that gives rise to the life of the 
mind, or spirit, the “noetic soul” whose existence consists, over and above 
survival of the fittest, in the transgression of biological patterns of behavior. 
Like the physiological organ, the technical organ is susceptible to future 
change, but unlike the naked hand, whose mutation in genetic replication is 
always unforeseen, the hand refunctionalized by the tool can anticipate its future 
forms and actively bring them into existence. Through artificial selection, we 
cease to be mere products of our genetic history and become the architects of our 
own future, inventing an agency that is wrested away from genetics. It is in this 
sense, Stiegler claims, that technical evolution marks a break with evolution by 
natural selection. The history of humanity will thus be a “history of the 
supplement,”7 meaning the history of our externalization, or deferral, into the 
technical prostheses through which we repeatedly invent ourselves. This history is 
also a “genealogy of the sensible” (MS2, 79), of the transformation, or 
“sublimation,” of sensory stimulus  (“l’âme sensitive”) into shared and socially 
regulated meaning (“le sensible”), via the construction of a technical-symbolic, 
aesthetic, social order (MS2, 70, 198). In line with what he calls “general 
organology,” meaning not just the physiological, but the technical organs and 
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social organizations in which human life consists, Stiegler undertakes to analyze 
how different (physiological, technical) organs across human and pre-human 
history have generated the originating conditions of different modes of experience 
(MS2, 188). This genealogy is split into two overlapping parts, corresponding to 
two kinds of technical evolution in Stiegler’s work, only the second of which fully 
captures his interest in the term. The first of these, developed in his early works on 
André Leroi-Gourhan, pertains to the “paleo- and archaeo-analysis of 
hominization” (MS2, 188), or the corticalization of the so-called anatomically 
modern human, which results from the co-evolution of brain and tool. The second 
kind of technical evolution explains how our physiological organs are continually 
de- and re-functionalized by the accumulated technical organs and symbolic order 
of culture, which organize subjectivity via the synaptic circuitry of the brain, 
without the effects ever passing into our gene pool and phenotype. The regulatory 
social system of culture thus consists in a kind of externalized memory or 
technical unconscious that conditions what and how we experience—and which 
therefore lies at the heart of both our prevailing aesthetic codes and their very 
opposite, namely the anti-stereotypical, frequently traumatic, encounter that we 
find in art. 
 
 
Function-shift and “general organology” 
 
One of the most powerful early criticisms leveled at Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection was the question of what St. George Mivart, in On the Genesis of 
Species (1871), termed “the incompetency of natural selection.”8 The phrase 
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alludes to an issue over the seemingly dubious adaptive function of proto-organs, 
or the question of how notionally unfinished organs could ever evolve to the point 
where they would serve a purpose. If, as Darwin claimed, adaptive traits were the 
result of cumulative series of minor and moreover contingent changes, then every 
minor mutation on the way to, say, the gradual evolution of a wing would also, by 
that logic, have to confer an adaptive advantage. But, as Stephen Jay Gould would 
later pose the problem, what kind of advantage is to be found in just “2 per cent of 
a wing,”9 which would by no means suffice for flight? Darwin himself anticipated 
this problem, noting that “in considering transitions of organs, it is so important to 
bear in mind the probability of conversion from one function to another.”10 So, 
too, did Friedrich Nietzsche, who famously observed that an organ’s “function” is 
hit upon only retroactively, once interpretation has revealed the uses to which it 
can be put. “The whole history of a ‘thing,’ an organ, a tradition can to this extent 
be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and 
adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst 
themselves.”11 The answer, in other words, is that the function of an earlier stage 
of an evolving organ need not be continuous with its subsequent forms; nor need 
it have served any purpose at all. The protean wing was not initially a diminished, 
imperfect organ of flight (a glider, or stabilizer), but a mechanism for 
thermoregulation, the maintenance of body temperature. The traditional 
evolutionary term for this kind of function-shift is “preadaptation,” meaning an 
adaptation that lends itself to being refunctionalized as something else. Since 
preadaptation carries connotations of both Lamarckian teleology and the neo-
Darwinist (“adaptationist”) idea that all variation in nature must bear some 
evolutionary advantage, Gould suggests the alternative and “more inclusive term 
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‘exaptation’—for any organ not evolved under natural selection for its current 
use—either because it performed a different function in ancestors (classical 
preadaptation) or because it represented a non-functional part available for later 
co-optation.”12  
 Bernard Stiegler does not himself refer to exaptation, nor to preadaptation 
for that matter, but the function-shift of physiological—and social—organs is 
central to his concerns, particularly insofar, he argues, as function-shifts can be 
induced by technics. He writes of “a defunctionalization and refunctionalization of 
the living organism, brought about by the advent of the dead organs that are 
technical objects,” a de- and refunctionalization of physiological organs by our 
technical prostheses (MS2, 221). The process of de- and re-functionalization 
becomes crucial to his assertion of a rupture between the evolution by natural 
selection of man as animal and the artificial, technical selection that characterizes 
the technical evolution of human mind, or spirit. In Symbolic Misery, 2: The 
Catastrophe of the Sensible (2005), the back half of the work on aesthetics that 
bridges the first three volumes of Technics and Time and the Disbelief and 
Discredit series, Stiegler expands his earlier formulation of technical evolution as 
“the pursuit of life by means other than life” (TT1, 17/31). Borrowing from a well-
known formulation of French inheritance law, also cited by Marx in the preface to 
Capital, he argues that technical evolution pertains to the ways in which “the dead 
takes hold of the living,” le mort saisit le vif (MS2, 218 n.1).13 The phrase refers, 
in this instance, to the co-optation, or reinterpretation, of biological organs by the 
“organized, inorganic matter” of technics. Stiegler christens the study of these 
interactions “general organology,” meaning a logic that encompasses not just our 
vital, sensory organs, but the non-living technical organs that transform their 
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function, and also the social organizations that determine which refunctionalizing 
technics we adopt: “organology as the co-individuation of living organs, artificial 
organs and the organizations that link them together, in such a way that vital 
organs are defunctionalized in relation to the individuation of life” (MS2, 222). 
The “general,” here, is taken from the early Derrida, who frequently deploys the 
qualification “en général” to designate being “prior to the distinction between man 
and animal, and even before the distinction between the living and the non-
living.” 14 Stiegler reprises it in his own early work, referring to “life in general” 
and “the history of life in general,” both of which are given as names for the 
operation of différance, in which the prosthesis retraces and thereby reinvents the 
(“specific,” or species-related, “zoological”) body that it supplements (TT1, 136-
9/148-51). General organology thus captures the idea that the organs of human life 
are not restricted to the physiological organs of Homo sapiens sapiens as a 
biological species. They also encompass the external, technical organs and social 
organizations whose internalization gives rise to the life of the mind, or spirit:  
 
General organology has the vocation of studying . . . the physiological 
organs of the body in relation to artefactual organs and the organizations 
that make up the body of society, and the characteristics of these organs 
insofar as they set to work the retentional apparatuses that operate [artificial] 
selection.  . . . General organology is therefore the study of the dead and the 
living. (MS2, 216-18) 
 
Where a specific, or species-based, organology would study only biological forms 
of negentropy, general organology takes as its object the technical organs of 
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human society. These “artefactual” organs serve as the bases of the artificial, as 
opposed to natural, selection in which human life consists. 
 Drawing on Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the quasi-cause, from Logic of 
Sense, Stiegler describes them as being “quasi-causal,” constituting “a way out of 
‘material’ causality, in the common sense of the term.”15 This clearly does not 
mean that technical objects are not material, and should rather be taken as a claim 
about the way in which technics create horizons of expectation from which our 
actions will be suspended. By enabling us to break with the retroactively 
conferred “fitness” of adaptation, by enabling us to overcome maladaptation 
through the transformation of our environment, technics enable us to create—and 
desire—our own future. They lift us out of the mere imperative to survive and 
elevate life into “a struggle for existence,” which is to say, a struggle that goes 
beyond the mere “subsistence” of resisting death.16 Existence, in this respect, 
consists in the way that tools take us out (ex-) of our inhesion in biology and open 
us onto alternative possibilities of being. We ex-ist because we con-sist in 
technics, suspended between our bodies and our tools, between our technical 
heritage and the visions of a world that this heritage enables us to project. 
 
 
Coevolution and epiphylogenesis 
 
Writing in the post-war period, André Leroi-Gourhan argued that humans’ 
evolutionary niche consists in our ability continually to reinvent ourselves through 
technics, and thereby overcome our absence of anatomical specialization (GS1, 
117/168).
17
 For Leroi-Gourhan, technics marks a continuation of evolution by 
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other means, with different techniques amounting to mutations external to the 
biological organism, for whose deficiencies they substitute. He suggested that 
society is made possible by the externalization of movement, displaced into 
animals and machines that we operate through the organs that would once 
themselves have done the moving. “The hand-tool could be seen as the instrument 
of liberation from the genetic constraints by which an animal’s organic 
implements are tied to the zoological species” (GS2, 227/21). Through technics, 
we free up our organs for alternative uses.  
 Yet technology is only a continuation, or a different variety, of the 
liberations already found throughout the history of evolution. Our ability to 
reinvent ourselves through tool-use presupposes a series of “successive 
‘liberations’” of anatomy that paved the way for bodies to be interpreted 
differently (GS1, 117/167), evolutionary mutations that made possible the 
technical transformation of our ancestors’ limbs and sensory organs. Leroi-
Gourhan undertook a painstaking comparison of the gradual anatomical changes 
that would (contingently) culminate in the liberated skeletal motricity of humans, 
beginning with the flattening of the foot and upright walking, which coincide with 
the liberation of the hand and of a skull that was hitherto restricted to limited 
movements at the top of the vertebral column (GS2, 117/167). Bipedalism means 
that the hand is defunctionalized from its previous task of locomotion and 
refunctionalized for “prehension” (GS2, 240-2/41). The new uses for which it is 
freed include not just reaching for food and, ultimately, the manipulation of tools, 
but also the grooming and interpersonal contact that will prove vital to human 
socialization (GS2, 239/38). The “liberation of the forehead” comprises the 
disappearance of the brow ridge, and the flattening of the face through the 
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thinning of the chin, jawbone and teeth (GS1, 71, 75/102, 108). And with the 
grasping hand now preferred to the outstretched neck, the jaw, tongue and lips—
still accompanied by hand gestures—are liberated for speech (GS1, 112-14/161-2).  
These preadaptations of the hand and mouth for technics and speech, 
respectively, would, in time, give rise to further adaptations, including “special 
adaptations for cross-generational learning,” such as genes that allow flint-
knapping to be learned reliably and at low risk of injury to the learner.
18
  
In this respect, anatomy is honed for purpose by what Stiegler, following Leroi-
Gourhan, terms the “co-evolution” of tool and brain. Evolutionary theory more 
generally calls this “gene-culture coevolution” and it describes situations where a 
built cultural environment facilitates the survival and selection of some genes over 
others, for example, by affording protection to individuals who may otherwise 
have fallen foul of the survival of the fittest, or by conferring selective advantage 
on those members of society better preadapted to adopt its toolsets. For Stiegler, 
coevolution already marks a shift away from natural selection. Humans’ ability to 
transform their environments through technics results in “relaxing the effects of 
selection pressure and in suspending natural selection as the law of the struggle 
for life, and even suspending the biological evolution of the human species, . . . 
displacing the evolutionary process into artificial organs.”19  
Our constitution through artificial organs nonetheless goes far beyond 
interfering in the process of natural selection. Gene-culture coevolution prevailed 
as genetic adaptations for tool-use were selected and passed on to subsequent 
generations, until the point where Homo sapiens sapiens became the only 
remaining extant form of the genus Homo. At this point, though still ongoing over 
the decelerating course of evolutionary time, coevolution recedes into the 
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background and a second type of technical evolution comes to the fore (MS2, 239-
30). This is the evolution of technical and social systems that Stiegler labels 
epiphylogenesis, meaning the transmission of acquired experience from 
generation to generation via the cultural practices that become sedimented in and 
around technical objects. By adopting a culture’s tools and immersing ourselves in 
the experience and possibilities to which they give access, we inherit our 
ancestors’ knowledge without it having had to pass into the “phylogeny,” or 
genetic history, of the species (hence the prefix “epi-phylogenesis,” indicating 
“outside” or “in addition” to the species line). And in inheriting their acquired 
experience, we also inherit their way of interpreting the world. The “genealogy of 
the sensible” thus refers not only to the evolutionary-biological architecture of our 
sensory organs, but also to the refunctionalization of these organs by technics that 
reinvent the field of experience. Irrespective of their anatomical and broad genetic 
identity, as Stiegler puts it, “a foot that presses down on an accelerator pedal and 
essentially rotates along these lines is no longer, organologically speaking, which 
is to say, insofar as it is an organ inscribed within the circuit of a desire, the same 
foot as that of a bushman who runs in the savannah,” for the simple reason that 
“such organs no longer economize libido in the same manner” (MS2, 227). 
Anatomically, the body has remained the same from the Middle Paleolithic, 
through the Neolithic Revolution in agriculture, the proto-writing systems of the 
Bronze Age, and the advent of industrial machinery up until our present, so-called 
Digital Age. But this period encompasses entire histories of the multiform ways in 
which human bodies have been de- and refunctionalized by technics, their 
energies differently harnessed and (“libidinally”) invested in the construction of 
societies. From the slower, more patient expectations of cultures in which letter-
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writing and low-intensity farming predominate, to our contemporary obsession 
with the immediate gratification offered by high-yield instant returns and constant 
availability, different tools give rise to radically different experiences of time, 
desire, and attention, by standing us in varying affective relation to the possible 
futures onto which we are opened up through their adoption. The root of these 
differences, Stiegler suggests, is to be found in the effect of technics on the 
neurally-plastic brain, whose circuitry is continually reorganized by the prosthetic 
conditioning of the body. 
 The brain occupies a privileged place in the theory of general organology, 
albeit one that is under-developed at present.
20
 In a line of thinking developed in 
the forthcoming Technics and Time, 4 (Symboles et diaboles, previewed in the 
2012-13 filmed seminar series on Stiegler’s pharmakon.fr), the closing chapters of 
The Catastrophe of the Sensible propose that the principal organ of the central 
nervous system “must be thought as the organ of relations between the dead and 
the living” (MS2, 218), as the nexus through which the body undergoes its de- and 
refunctionalization through technics (MS2, 229). The idea that subjectivity 
consists in an internalization of our externalization in technics has been central to 
Stiegler’s concerns since the first volume of Technics and Time, The Fault of 
Epimetheus, and his current interests lie in an explicit return to this opening 
theme. The earlier work articulates the process of simultaneous externalization 
and internalization as the movement of différance (or rather, of the “différance of 
différance”), in which the who and the what repeatedly retrace one another, with 
the subject producing the technical object, which then reinvents the subject, and 
so on (TT1, 176-8/184-6). The recent Pharmacologie du Front National (2013) 
clarifies what is at stake in this reinvention, as Stiegler draws on the 
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neuroscientists Maryanne Wolf and Stanislas Dehaene to argue that reading 
consists in the recycling (or “exaptation”) of neural circuitry that originally 
evolved for something else; and that the ways in which the brain is 
refunctionalized by technics vary across time and space. The transition from oral 
to written culture coinciding with the invention of the alphabet, for instance, “was 
translated by a reorganization of the cortex, which is to say, by the establishment 
of synaptogenetic processes that literally inscribed the letter into the cerebral 
organ”: our prostheses write directly into the brain.21 His current projects further 
develop this claim via the work of figures including Joseph LeDoux, on “synaptic 
selfhood” and the sense in which our “plastic” neural structures are “modifiable 
by experience,”22 and the psychologist Merlin Donald, who has supplemented 
evolutionary biology with an account of how culture restructures the 
“fundamental neurological organization” of the brain, “literally reconfiguring the 
sensory cortex.”23  
This neuroscientific turn might suggest that Stiegler’s work is converging 
with that of another major figure in contemporary French philosophy, namely 
Catherine Malabou, who engages with neural plasticity as part of a broader 
program of reconciling psychoanalysis with contemporary neurology. Focusing 
specifically on the relation of cerebral function to the experience of trauma, 
Malabou argues that the experience of traumatic shock consists in a 
disorganization of affect, an emotional disengagement that can be traced to the 
destruction of the neural synaptic networks in which our conditioned behaviors 
are embedded.
24
 In Stieglerian terms, that would seem to equate trauma with a 
kind of extreme culture shock, in which our internalization of the cultural memory 
externalized in technics breaks down. The undoing of the external symbolic 
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coordinates of identity would thus coincide with the loss of the affective 
experience that these coordinates organize. In Stiegler’s account, however, trauma 
pertains less to a loss of affect than to a reawakening thereof, and it needs to be 
understood in the context of a theory of general organology that traces the origins 
of the unconscious to technics. By positing the unconscious as an organ produced 
through the de- and re-functionalization of the body through technics—a result of 
artificial and not natural selection—, he moreover shows it to be deeply bound up 
with aesthetic experience.  
 
 
“The artefactual organization of the sensible” 
 
Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of 
modification. 
 Charles Darwin
25
 
 
Perhaps the most dramatic example Stiegler gives of an epiphylogenetic 
refunctionalization of the body is found in his account of the unconscious, which 
is theorized not as a product of biological evolution, but rather as technical in 
origin, pertaining to the ways in which experience is conditioned by the 
prostheses through which the world is made sensible to us. His theory of the 
technical unconscious reworks the unconscious mind as a repository of culturally 
inculcated patterns of experience passed down through the generations, with 
trauma amounting to exposure to forms of experience to which our bodies have 
not been habituated. In saying this, Stiegler provides an alternative to the much-
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criticized Freudian view, in which the traumas of our ancestors appear to be 
inherited and endured in the present through a process of biological 
transmission.
26
  
 To locate the origin of the unconscious, Stiegler takes us back to the 
advent of bipedalism, and suggests that there was more going on than just the 
liberation of the hand for tool-use. Upright walking coincided with another 
function-shift in our hominid ancestors’ sensory organs, “an organic repression at 
the origin of repression in general” (MS2, 200). In the penultimate chapter of 
Symbolic Misery, entitled “The Repression of Freud”, Stiegler recounts the details 
of an early letter from Freud to his mentor, Wilhelm Fliess, in November 1897, in 
which the psychoanalyst’s observation of his bottom-sniffing dog leads him to 
hypothesize a refunctionalization of the sensory organs as an additional 
consequence of humans’ shift to bipedalism: “upright walking, nose raised from 
the ground, at the same time a number of formerly interesting sensations attached 
to the earth become repulsive.”27 When the nose had been level with the anus, 
Freud muses, anal-olfactory stimulation — with its capacity for disease detection 
— would have been a notable indicator of sexual attraction. The shift to upright 
walking entailed a libidinal decathexis, or defunctionalization, of both the nose 
and the anus on which it was hitherto trained, with the brunt of detecting attraction 
thenceforth falling on the eyes, which are accordingly refunctionalized. This idea 
is carried over into a footnote in Civilization and Its Discontents, where Freud 
further speculates that the previously eroticized odors of excreta and female 
menstruation become an object of taboo and “organic repression.” The genitals, 
too, now give rise to shame, and so are covered up with clothing.
28
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 Stiegler reads this as the “defunctionalization of the sense of smell” and 
moreover as “a defunctionalization of the sexual . . . such as it is formed in 
animality” (MS2, 200, 206-7). But while crediting Freud for recognizing the 
significance of organological function-shift, he is nonetheless critical of the 
psychoanalyst’s failure to link the ensuing refunctionalization of the eye to a 
technicization of sexuality, hence also to a process that inaugurates “a new epoch 
of aesthetics in the long history of the sensibility of the sexually differentiated 
animal” (MS2, 205). His contention, in other words, is that aesthetics begins when 
technics are offered up to sight; when the odors of animal sexuality give way to 
the “artefactualization of the beautiful” (MS2, 210). As Stiegler shows by turning 
to Darwin via Leroi-Gourhan, the beautiful, technical artefacts in question are the 
clothes and other stylings through which humans differentiate themselves from 
one another.  
In Freud’s account of human nature, the constitutive role of technics in the 
invention of the human “has been repressed,” just as it has throughout the history 
of Western metaphysics (MS2, 228). Perhaps surprisingly, the same cannot so 
easily be said of Darwin. Endorsing the idea that “clothes were first made for 
ornament and not for warmth,”29 the closing chapters of The Descent of Man 
(1871) document the various ways in which humans, irrespective of tribe and 
ethnicity, use prostheses as supplementary secondary sexual characteristics. 
Darwin describes how sexual selection, meaning the struggle to procure a mate for 
the purposes of reproduction, becomes inseparable from “artificial selection.” In 
On the Origin of Species, this phrase was employed to denote the selective 
breeding of domesticated animals, but it has since acquired the sense of using 
“artificial means” like hair sculpting, bodily adornment, modification and 
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mutilation to heighten attractiveness.
30
 Stiegler reads Darwin as recognizing that 
desire is a product of culture (“the different races of man differ in their taste for 
the beautiful”),31 and as open to the prospect that criteria determining what we 
desire are transmitted across generations by a process other than natural selection. 
The first move in this direction is made, once again, by Leroi-Gourhan, 
who writes, in the second volume of the monumental Gesture and Speech (1964), 
that “the aesthetics of clothing and adornment, despite its wholly artificial 
character, is one of the biological traits of the human species most profoundly 
linked to the zoological world” (GS2, 351/189). In an insight that proves central to 
Stiegler, he traces the emergence of “aesthetic sensibility” from forms and 
behaviors found in nature through to the shared symbolic codes around which 
human communities are organized. Anticipating the theory of de- and 
refunctionalization, Léroi-Gourhan suggests that aesthetics originates in 
“biological properties common to all living organisms,” but attains its fullest 
sense in the extension of biology into technics that condition bodily rhythms and 
establish norms for the distribution of bodies within a given society (GS2, 271-
2/82-3). The wing markings of a butterfly function as signifiers of both natural 
and sexual selection, warding off predators and attracting mates, and thus  
 
belong to the uncertain world of style even if, in Darwinian terms, they 
perform a protective function for a certain length of time in the history of 
the species. Human decoration  
 
—by contrast— 
 
Gerald Moore (Feb 2017) ‘On the Origin of Aisthesis by Means of Artificial Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Traces in the Struggle for Existence’, scheduled to appear in Boundary 2, special issue Bernard Stiegler: 
Amateur Philosophy, ed. Arne de Boever. Vol. 44: 1. boundary2.dukejournals.org 
20 
only confirms the general rule of substitution of the ethnic group for the 
species; the same phenomena can be observed in the persistence of marks 
expressing the personality of a group. (GS2, 300/122) 
 
The artificial selections of human communities may facilitate survival, but they 
also, crucially, give rise to traditions that bind members of a society together, and 
thus furnish the rules of their transgenerational belonging. The prosthetic style of 
an ethnic group serves to establish its collective identity by laying out “values and 
rhythms” of the community (GS2, 278/93). It also, and moreover, communicates 
the hierarchy and internal differences of the group, via significations of rank or 
wealth that persist through the ages. Be they educational, military, religious or 
economic, the social organs of society participate in the “organization of the 
sensible” (MS2, 188), constructing a body politic schooled in interpreting the 
aesthetic, symbolic codes of social order. In re- and defunctionalizing the bodies 
of its members, by teaching them to read and write, for example, the organizations 
of this technical-symbolic order train us to decipher selected aesthetic codes 
(MS2, 70-4, 212-13). Every technical object and institutionalized body of 
knowledge is a “trace” of society’s acquired experience, an externalized memory 
support incorporating the generations of accumulated skill that went into their 
construction.  
 
Aesthetic awakening 
 
Social organization consists in “selecting from among these traces that which 
should be internalized by the body in the construction of a social body [dans le 
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faire-corps social]” (MS2, 232). This, Stiegler contends, is the origin of what 
Freud called the superego, the moral conscience that comes from the 
internalization of authority. He links it to the effect on the brain of the ongoing 
functional redefinition of physiological organs by technics (MS2, 229): 
 
As the seat of the unconscious . . . the brain relates to other organs and 
partial zones of the body in general through the mediation of technical 
objects that are external to the body. What is more, this relation to technical 
objects is subject to, or rather inscribed in, a relation of social organizations 
. . . in which are inscribed the rules of a superego that the brain can only 
internalize. (MS2, 225) 
 
When we adopt the institutions and prostheses of a culture as our own, they take 
hold of the body in a way that opens us up to new possibilities of feeling (le 
sentir), while also repressing others (MS2, 193). Through the accumulated 
knowledge sedimented in technics, we internalize a past that we never actually 
lived. Some of these artificial selections become engrained as second nature, to 
the point where, like Nietzsche’s coin of truth, they lose their “sensuous power” of 
transformation.
32
 Their repeated circulation nonetheless conditions stereotypical 
patterns of social behavior, serving to reinscribe a horizon of expectation that 
governs how and what a society knowingly or unconsciously experiences. These 
“stereotypical” elements of technico-cultural memory, whose adoption and 
internalization reinforces the habitual organization of experience, are to be 
differentiated from those that “overwhelm this organization” (MS2, 235). Stiegler 
terms the latter “traumatypes,” and suggests that even trauma pertains to this kind 
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of de- and refunctionalization of our brain and sensory organs. As with all 
“noetic,” “sensible,” as opposed to merely “sensory,” experience, it results from 
the conditioning of our anatomical apparatus. We have to be sensitized into 
experiencing an event as traumatic. The “return of the repressed” consists in a 
reactivation of forgotten circuits of signification, where an anxiety endured by 
ancestors, and transmitted through history via the organization of culture, is 
unconsciously inherited in the present. Whether a brush with death or a terrifying 
intellectual encounter, we experience trauma as traumatic to the extent that an 
event provokes a resurfacing of previously internalized traumatypes, buried deep 
within us and prevented from becoming conscious by the masking effect of our 
established patterns of thought. The violence of the awakening shakes us out of 
our prevailing stereotypes (MS2, 235-9). 
 Yet trauma, according to Stiegler, is not purely negative. Recalling the 
language of Leroi-Gourhan, he describes the overturning of an existing 
organization of the sensible in terms of “liberation”: “The liberation of the 
unexpected is therefore the liberation of a repressed expectation” (MS2, 236). The 
traumatic breaking with stereotype is moreover identified with philosophy—and 
also with the work of art, both of which are reconceived around the idea of the 
“anamnesis,” or recollection, that Stiegler takes to be at the heart of philosophy’s 
“repressed” and “unthought” encounter with technics (TT1, ix/11). Balanced on 
the sublime precipice between ordeal and wonder, philosophy and art consist in 
the unsettling revelation of an unknown past that haunts us; in the ghostly return 
of a cultural memory one never consciously lived, but which is retraced in the 
opening up of new possibilities of experience. The epiphany is less an exhaustive 
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moment of recognition than a surprised seizing upon of that which exceeds our 
grasp: 
 
Comprehension is reduction to the same, and surprehension is the 
experience of the other in the same—which is to say, the experience of the 
singularity of the sensible.   
This is the experience of meaning [signifiance], where that which is 
experienced . . . suddenly comes to explode the expectations settled upon by 
stereotypical secondary retentions, and . . . like all spiritual works opens a 
way for the traumatypical power of repressed secondary retentions to return 
to the surface, thereby constituting what one might call a Proust-like 
moment of anamnesis: the return of an ancient traumatype, coming back 
[revenant] like a phantom, a spirit, or a punchline [un mot d’esprit] . . .  
 Yet this “resurfacing” of a traumatype, which always arises 
simultaneously from preindividual depths [un fonds pre-individuel] proper 
to and lived by one’s self (secondary retentions and protentions), from a 
preindividual fund [un fonds pre-individuel] inherited from one’s ancestors 
but which one never lived oneself (proto-protentions and proto-retentions), 
and from a fund common to though never fully lived by all desiring (human) 
creatures, . . . a traumatypical resurfacing of this kind is only ever produced 
under conditions constituted by the historical state of . . . the de- and 
refunctionalization that tertiary memory presupposes and enables. (MS2, 
237-8) 
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The passage is shot through with the language of Husserlian phenomenology, in 
which “secondary retention”—as distinct from the “primary retention” of a 
moment that has just passed—refers to consciously reproducible memories. These 
memories structure our internal consciousness of time, including not just the past 
that we retain but also the future expectations, or “protentions,” that they habituate 
us into projecting.
33
 Stiegler’s contention is that secondary retentions are 
embedded in the external (“tertiary”) memory supports of technics, with 
unconscious memories of an unlived past inscribed in the body over the course of 
cultural conditioning, through the refunctionalization of the sensory cortex by the 
inherited technics that we adopt as our own. In the experience of anamnesis, the 
body enters into relation with prostheses that tap into our artefactual history, firing 
neurons along synapses hitherto pushed to the back of the mind, stimulating parts 
of the cortex weakened by disuse. If we encounter the return of the repressed in 
the work of art, it is because it disorganizes our habitual rhythms of thought and 
experience, relaxing the protensions that structure our expectations, and which 
would otherwise reign in our ability to envisage futures that differ from the 
present.   
The description of this kind of awakening as traumatic risks seeming 
somewhat romantic alongside Malabou’s characterization of trauma as “affective 
barrenness,”34 and there is surely more to be done to develop Stiegler’s theory of 
general organology alongside the neuroscience of aesthetic experience. From his 
writing to date, it is not yet clear, for example, how the prosthetic organization of 
our synaptic circuits fits with the neurobiology of affect and the de- and 
refunctionalization of the pleasure center of the brain. We can find some pointers, 
though, in recent experimental evidence, according to which “the making and 
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breaking of neuronal connections stimulates the expression of neurotransmitters 
strongly associated with pleasure in ways that no doubt affect aesthetic 
experiences.”35 Research suggests that the repetition-inducing release of dopamine 
coincides with the recollection of favorably remembered sensory stimuli, causing 
us to crave their return. As the frequency of this return sees exception give way to 
stereotypical rule, tolerance to the hormone increases and the pleasure felt 
diminishes. And when the affective returns on these stereotypes become minimal 
(say, with symptoms of addiction), the transgression of our acquired habits 
provides a different kind of redemption. We move from the comfortable 
gratification of prevailing cultural tastes to the unsettling, complex and potentially 
intolerable, traumatypical, experience of liberation that Roland Barthes identifies 
with “the destruction of that culture.”36 For Barthes, the work of art consists in the 
balancing of these two kinds of pleasure, with the familiar, identifiable plaisir 
offsetting the traumatic excesses of jouissance. This anticipates what neuroscience 
describes as the (culturally variable) play of harmony and dissonance
37
 —and 
perhaps also what, thorough Stiegler, we might conceive as a sublimation, or 
deferral, of trauma, a différance of the past we inherit through technics. 
 
Stiegler’s post-Darwinism 
 
Work in the nascent field of evolutionary aesthetics tends to subordinate ideas of 
the cultural conditioning of aesthetic experience to an emphasis on the evolved 
biological role of beauty in both natural and sexual selection. Insofar as technical 
objects have been noticed, interest in them is geared less toward their role in the 
transformation of their users and their users’ environments than toward their status 
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as “fitness signals,” meaning markers of highly adaptive skillsets valued by 
potential mates for their contribution to the survival of future progeny.
38
 The role 
of the work of art, in other words, is deemed subordinate to what it tells us about 
the adaptive fitness of its maker. Other notable ideas in evolutionary aesthetics 
emphasize the function of narrative in communicating valuable Darwinian 
lessons, identifying stories and art, not to mention the pleasure they occasion, as 
ways of internalizing the acquired experience of our ancestors, through whose 
recalled adventures we can vicariously rehearse strategies of mating and 
survival.
39
 This line of thought clearly accords some significance to the 
inheritance of cultural memory, though its focus remains on gene-culture 
coevolution and a narrowly construed facilitation of the preservation of life. Other 
theories of aesthetic experience create more of an opening for Stiegler’s account 
of epiphylogenesis and the genealogy of the sensible, the re- and de-
functionalization of our biological sensory architecture by technics, and the 
continued reinvention of the field of experience that this entails. Stephen Pinker 
reads the affective encounter with art in terms of a “non-adaptive exploitation of 
adaptive sources of pleasure,”40 in which the artwork exapts, or refunctionalizes, 
biological processes that originally evolved for something else, the pleasure 
circuitry related to sex, for instance. It is nonetheless acknowledged within the 
field that evolutionary psychology has so far found little to tell us about the 
different kinds of pleasure linked to aesthetics
41—which perhaps also explains 
why Stiegler’s interest in neuroscience has yet to inform his largely 
psychoanalytical account of the libidinal economy of desire.  
 Evolutionary biologists are routinely criticized for reducing aesthetics to 
biology,
42
 and, in a similar vein, it has been suggested that Stiegler collapses 
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aesthetics into technics, reducing the “critique of taste” to a discourse on 
prosthetics that fails to deal with questions of the criteria for the judgment of 
beauty.
43
 But that is surely to miss his key insight, namely that the technics that 
recalibrate sensory experience also furnish the bases of aesthetic preference. Our 
internalization of the artificial codes of society mean that we are no longer 
confined to an appreciation of the adaptive traits formed by natural and sexual 
selection. Artificial selection creates criteria for judgment other than fitness, and 
accumulated cultural memory functions as a system of rules for interpretation, its 
organization of symbolic order providing the schematism—the stereo- and 
traumatypes—for the ways in which we read experience and adopt the tools that 
we inherit.  
Elizabeth Grosz has made the case for aesthetics as an extension of sexual 
selection, a general economy of creativity that serves to “enhance the animal body 
and its surroundings” (2011: 132).44 Building on Darwin and later Uexküll, she 
also argues that the biological architectures of different species preclude a 
homogenous, anthropocentric conception of aesthetics and technics.
45
 The 
elaborate nests of the bowerbird and the twig-enhanced antlers of the red deer, far 
more than the flower-painting elephants of the Thai tourist trade, would be 
illustrative of this, pointing to the existence of artificial selection among non-
human animals. But they also, and pace Grosz, reveal a logic of technics that falls 
short of epiphylogenesis, if only by degree. Non-human bodies can be de- and 
refunctionalized by technics, but that is not to say they participate in the 
construction of an aesthetic, symbolic order. Primatologists broadly accept, for 
example, that the tools of even our closest non-human relatives are reinvented 
from scratch with each generation. The termite-fishing rods of the bonobo are not 
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adopted as the products of cumulative and coordinated cultural learning in which 
the favored traces of the past are bequeathed to posterity; nor is their use 
characterized by the pedagogy, intergenerational transmission and social 
organization of enforced cultural norms found among members of the genus 
Homo.
46
 They are thus not the bearers of an unconscious, ancestral history whose 
inheritance allows the envisioning of sublime and traumatic alternatives to strictly 
biological horizons of sensation. Our culturally-acquired ability to project new 
futures opens up the prospect of liberation from our inhumanity. Technics, in 
other words, enable us to be “not-inhuman”47—a term that Stiegler employs in 
distinction to humanity, and which captures the memory of tragic histories that 
cannot simply be explained away by animality. If the human, or not-inhuman 
exists, it does so only “intermittently,” and consisting in a promise we glimpse in 
the mirror of art.  
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